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Abstract The European General Data Protection Regula-
tion (GDPR) calls for technical and organizationalmeasures
to support its implementation. Towards this end, the SPE-
CIAL H2020 project aims to provide a set of tools that can
be used by data controllers and processors to automatically
check if personal data processing and sharing complies with
the obligations set forth in the GDPR. The primary contri-
butions of the project include: (i) a policy language that can
be used to express consent, business policies, and regulatory
obligations; and (ii) two different approaches to automated
compliance checking that can be used to demonstrate that
data processing performed by data controllers / processors
complies with consent provided by data subjects, and busi-
ness processes comply with regulatory obligations set forth
in the GDPR.
1 Introduction
The European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),
which came into force on the 25th of May 2018, defines le-
gal requirements concerning the processing and sharing of
personally identifiable data. In addition, the legislation calls
for technical and organizational measures to support its im-
plementation.
When it comes to legal informatics there is a large body
of work on legal knowledge representation and reasoning
(cf., [2, 4, 9, 14, 17, 18]), however said approaches are usu-
ally foundational in nature and as such are not readily acces-
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sible for companies looking for technical means to demon-
strate GDPR compliance.
Recently we have seen the emergence of GDPR com-
pliance tools (cf., [1, 10, 15, 16]) in the form of predefined
questionnaires that enable data controllers and processors to
assess the compliance of services and products that process
personal data. The primary limitation of said tools is their
lack of support for automated compliance checking.
In order to fill this gap, SPECIAL builds upon a rich
history of policy language research from the Semantic Web
community (cf., [7, 11, 12, 22, 23]), and shows how together
machine understandable policies and automated compliance
checking can be used to demonstrate compliance with legal
requirements set forth in the GDPR.
In particular, we introduce the SPECIAL policy lan-
guage and discuss how it can be used to express consent,
business policies, and regulatory obligations. In addition, we
describe two different approaches to automated compliance
checking used to demonstrate that: (i) data processing per-
formed by data controllers / processors complies with con-
sent provided by data subjects; and (ii) business processes
comply with regulatory obligations set forth in the GDPR.
In addition, we provide a highlevel overview of our compli-
ance checking algorithm and present the results of our initial
performance evaluation.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Sec-
tion 2 describes our analysis of the text of the GDPR. Sec-
tion 3 introduces the SPECIAL policy language, which pro-
vides a machine understandable encoding of consent. Sec-
tion 4 discusses how the SPECIAL policy language can be
used to encode business policies and regulatory obligations.
Section 5 presents our compliance checking algorithm and
the results of our initial performance evaluation. Section 6
points to related work on GDPR compliance. Finally, we
present our conclusions and interesting directions for future
work in Section 7.
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2 Requirements Analysis
One of the primary goals of SPECIAL is to automatically
check if personal data processing and sharing performed by
data controllers and processors complieswith obligations set
forth in the GDPR. A necessary first step is to better under-
stand the text of the GDPR, its interpretation by legal pro-
fessionals, and the role of machine understandable represen-
tations, and automated compliance checking.
2.1 GDPR Analysis
Legal rules are composed of several constructs, prohibitions
(used to describe what is not permitted), permissions (used
to describe what is permitted), obligations (used to describe
requirements that must be fulfilled), and dispensations (used
to describe exemptions), commonly referred to as deontic
concepts. In addition to these common constructs, the legal
language contains constraints (used to limit the scope of per-
missions, prohibitions, obligations and dispensations), def-
initions (used to establish meaning), dispositions (used to
highlight best practices/ suggestions), and opening clauses
(used to indicate the need to consult National or European
legislation). When it comes to encoding legislative require-
ments using machine understandable representations, such
that it is possible to perform automated compliance, major
considerations include:
Connectedness of the various articles, paragraphs, and
points, which can either explicitly refer to another piece of
legislation (e.g., “scientific or historical research purposes
or statistical purposes in accordance with Article 89(1)”)
or implicitly to knowledge about the law (e.g., “Personal
data shall be: (a) processed lawfully, fairly and in a trans-
parent manner in relation to the data subject (lawfulness,
fairness and transparency)”). In either case, from an auto-
mated compliance checking perspective, it is clear that legal
requirements are not separate and distinct rules but rather
rules need to be linked, clustered, and/or generalized in a
manner that enables the validation of a combination rules.
In SPECIAL we do not try to encode the entire GDPR, but
rather focus on encoding legislative obligations (relating to
several articles, paragraphs, and points) such that: (i) data
processing performed by data controllers / processors com-
plies with consent provided by data subjects; and (ii) busi-
ness processes comply with regulatory obligations set forth
in the GDPR.
Temporal expressions provide contextual information that
is relevant for the interpretation of actions that need to be
taken. Several different types of temporal expressions can
be found in the text of the GDPR, for instance:
– . . .“the right to withdraw his or her consent at any time”
(Article 7 paragraph 3);
– . . .“processing based on consent before its withdrawal”
(Article 7 paragraph 3, Article 13 paragraph 2, Article
14 paragraph 2);
– . . .“prior to giving consent” (Article 7 paragraph 3);
– . . .“at the time when personal data are obtained” (Arti-
cle 13 paragraphs 1 and 2);
– . . .“the personal data shall no longer be processed”
(Article 21 paragraph 3);
In SPECIAL we provide support for such temporal require-
ments by recording in a suitable transparency ledger when
consent was obtained or when the data processing/sharing
happened. This information is used for both ex-ante and ex-
post compliance checking (as well as other purposes, dis-
cussed later).
2.2 Legal Interpretations
The GDPR defines several potential legal bases (consent,
contract, legal obligation, vital interest, public interest, ex-
ercise of official authority, and legitimate interest) under
which companies can legally process personal data. In or-
der to determine if personal data processing is legally valid,
the legal inquiry process usually involves gathering spe-
cific information such as: (i) the personal data collected
from the data subject; (ii) the processing that are performed
on the personal data; (iii) the purpose of such processing;
(iv) where data are stored and for how long; and (v) with
whom data is shared. The answers provided to said ques-
tions enable legal professionals to determine which articles
need to be consulted in order both to assess the lawfulness
of processing and to identify relevant legal obligations.
Although, the open textured nature of legal texts is a
highly desirable feature, as it leaves room for interpretation
on a case by case basis, such ambiguity poses challenges
for automatic compliance checking. In terms of legal in-
terpretations, legal professionals also need to interpret the
facts of the case with respect to relevant National or Euro-
pean legislation (e.g., opening clauses) and subjective terms
(e.g., single words or parts of a sentence that can be inter-
preted in various ways). Here legal knowledge graphs could
potentially play a crucial role as they allow for the model-
ing of both legislation and cases in a machine readable for-
mat, based on standardization activities such as European
Law Identifier (ELI) and the European Case Law Identifier
(ECLI), which provide technical specifications for web iden-
tifiers and vocabularies that can be used to describe metadata
pertaining to legal documents. Such a legal knowledge graph
could be used not only to identify case specific legislation,
but also to uncover if there have been any prior cases that
could be used to reduce ambiguity. The SPECIAL poly lan-
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guage has been developed together with legal professionals
who well versed in the interpretation of legal texts. Going
forward we envisage that legal knowledge graphs could be
used to reduce subjectivity thus allowing us to perform au-
tomated compliance checking for a broader set of legislative
requirements.
2.3 Machine Understandable Representations
The GDPR poses at least two requirements that call for
a machine-understandable representation of data usage
modalities. Article 30 states that each controller shall main-
tain a record of the personal data processing activities under
its responsibility. The first paragraph specifies that such a
ledger should describe (among other information) the fol-
lowing aspects of data usage:
P1. the purpose of processing;
P2. a description of the categories of data subjects and of
the categories of personal data;
P3. the categories of recipients to whom the personal data
have been or will be disclosed;
P4. transfers of personal data to a third country or an in-
ternational organization (since cross-border data transfer
are subject to limitations);
P5. the envisaged time limits for erasure of the different cat-
egories of data;
P6. information about the processing, such as the security
measures mentioned in Article 32.
Recital 42 stresses that, where processing is based on the
data subject’s consent, the controller should be able to
demonstrate that the data subject has given consent to the
processing operation. SPECIAL addresses this issue by
recording consent in the transparency ledger (cf. Sec. 2.1).
The description of consent is similar to the description of
processing activities as per Article 30. While Article 6.1.(a)
– that introduces consent as a legal basis for personal data
processing – and Recital 42 explicitly mention only the pur-
pose of processing, Articles 13 and 14 add the other ele-
ments P2–P6 listed above. Concerning P6 (processing), it
should be specified whether any automated decision making
is involved, including profiling.
2.4 Automated Compliance Checking
Once such data usage descriptions are encoded in a
machine-understandable way, several tasks, related to
GDPR compliance, can be automated, including:
T1. Checking whether the processing complies with several
restrictions imposed by the GDPR, such as additional
requirements on the processing of sensitive data, restric-
tions on cross-border transfers, and compatibility of data
usage with the chosen legal basis. This kind of validation
requires a machine-understandable formalization of the
relevant parts of the GDPR.
T2. Checking whether a specific operation is permitted by
the available consent.
T3. Running ex-post auditing on the controller’s activities.
In SPECIAL this task is supported by logging data pro-
cessing events in the transparency ledger, and comparing
such events with consent.
T4. Finding the consent that justifies a specific processing
(for auditing or responding to a data subject’s inquiry).
The transparency ledger is also used in SPECIAL to pro-
vide dashboards to data subjects, that support them in mon-
itoring the use of their data and explaining why their con-
sent allowed specific operations. Such dashboards can also
be used as a uniform interface to let data subjects exercise
their rights (access to data, right to erasure, etc.) as specified
by Articles 15–18 and 21–22.
3 Consent Compliance Checking
Although there are several potential legal bases that could
be used to lawfully process personal data, in SPECIAL we
have a particular focus on consent. Thus in this section we
present the SPECIAL policy language and demonstrate how
it can be used to encode consent in a manner than enables
automated compliance checking.
3.1 Encoding Usage Descriptions and Consent
The common structure of the activity records and of the con-
sent forms, consisting of properties P1–P6, is called simple
(usage) policy in SPECIAL. In general, both the controller’s
activities and the consent of data subjects can be described
by a set of simple usage policies (covering different data
categories and purposes), called full (usage) policies. Each
simple policy can be specified simply by attaching to each
property Pi (such as purpose, data category, recipients, etc.)
a term selected from a suitable vocabulary (ontology).
Example 1 A company – call it BeFit – sells a wearable
fitness appliance and wants (i) to process biometric data
(stored in the EU) for sending health-related advice to its
customers, and (ii) share the customer’s location data with
their friends. Location data are kept for a minimum of one
year but no longer than 5; biometric data are kept for an un-
specified amount of time. In order to do all this legally, Be-
Fit needs consent from its customers. Consent can be repre-
sented with two simple policies, specified using SPECIAL’s
vocabularies:
{
has_purpose: FitnessRecommendation,
has_data: BiometricData,
has_processing: Analytics,
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has_recipient: BeFit,
has_storage: { has_location: EU }
}
{
has_purpose: SocialNetworking,
has_data: LocationData,
has_processing: Transfer,
has_recipient: DataSubjFriends,
has_storage: {
has_location: EU,
has_duration: [1year,5year]
}
}
If HeartRate is a subclass of BiometricData and
ComputeAvg is a subclass of Analytics, then the above
consent allows BeFit to compute the average heart rate of the
data subject in order to send her fitness recommendations.
BeFit customers may restrict their consent, e.g. by picking
a specific recommendation modality, like “recommendation
via SMS only”. Then the first line should be replaced with
something like:
has_purpose:{
FitnessRecommendation,
contact: SMS}
Moreover, a customer of BeFit may consent to the first or
the second argument of the union, or both. Their consent
would be encoded, respectively, with the first simple policy,
the second simple policy, or both. Similarly, each single pro-
cess in the controller’s business application may use only
biometric data, only location data, or both. Accordingly, it
may be associated to the first simple policy, the second sim-
ple policy, or both.
The temporary exemplifying policy language vocabular-
ies reported in SPECIAL’s deliverables have been obtained
by adapting previous standardized terms introduced by ini-
tiatives related to privacy and digital rights management,
such as P3P1 and ODRL,2. More refined vocabularies have
been recently proposed by W3C’s Data Privacy Vocabular-
ies and Controls Community Group, (DPVCG) [19], pro-
moted by SPECIAL and spanning a range of stakeholders
wider than the project’s consortium. The current vocabular-
ies can be found on DPVCG’s website3.
As shown in Example 1, usage policies can be formatted
with a minor extension of JSON (in particular, compound
terms and policy sets require additional operators), while vo-
cabularies can be encoded in RDFS or lightweight profiles
of OWL2 such as OWL2-EL and OWL2-QL.
A grammar for SPECIAL policy expressions in Backus-
Naur form (BNF) format is presented in Figure 1. The cat-
egories DataVocabExpression, PurposeVocabExpression, Pro-
cessingVocabExpression, RecipientVocabExpression, Location-
VocabExpression, DurationVocabExpression are specified by
DPVCG’s vocabularies.
1 http://www.w3.org/TR/P3P11
2 https://www.w3.org/TR/odrl/
3 www.w3.org/community/dpvcg/
Fig. 1: SPECIAL’s Usage Policy Language Grammar
UsagePolicy :=’ObjectUnionOf’ ’(’ BasicUsagePolicy
{ BasicUsagePolicy }* ’)’
| BasicUsagePolicy
BasicUsagePolicy :=’ObjectIntersectionOf’ ’(’ Data Purpose
Processing Recipients Storage ’)’
Data :=’ObjectSomeValueFrom’ ’(’ ’spl:hasData’ DataExpres-
sion ’)’
Purpose :=’ObjectSomeValueFrom’ ’(’ ’spl:hasPurpose’ Pur-
poseExpression ’)’
Processing :=’ObjectSomeValueFrom’ ’(’ ’spl:hasProcessing’
ProcessingExpression ’)’
Recipients :=’ObjectSomeValueFrom’ ’(’ ’spl:hasRecipient’ Re-
cipientExpression ’)’
Storage :=’ObjectSomeValueFrom’ ’(’ ’spl:hasStorage’ Stor-
ageExpression ’)’
DataExpression :=’spl:AnyData’ | DataVocabExpression
PurposeExpression :=’spl:AnyPurpose’ | PurposeVocabEx-
pression
ProcessingExpression :=’spl:AnyProcessing’ | Process-
ingVocabExpression
RecipientsExpression :=’spl:AnyRecipient’ | ’spl:Null’ | Re-
cipientVocabExpression
StorageExpression :=’spl:AnyStorage’ | ’spl:Null’ |
’ObjectIntersectionOf’ ’(’ Location Duration ’)’
Location :=’ObjectSomeValueFrom’ ’(’ ’spl:hasLocation’ Loca-
tionExpression ’)’
Duration :=’ObjectSomeValueFrom’ ’(’ ’spl:hasDuration’ Dura-
tionExpression ’)’
| ’DataSomeValueFrom’ ’(’ ’spl:durationInDays’ In-
tervalExpression ’)’
LocationExpression :=’spl:AnyLocation’ | LocationVocab-
Expression
DurationExpression :=’spl:AnyDuration’ | DurationVocabEx-
pression
IntervalExpression :=’DatatypeRestriction’ ’(’ ’xsd:integer’
LowerBound UpperBound ’)’
LowerBound :=’xsd:minInclusive’ IntegerLiteral
UpperBound :=’xsd:maxInclusive’ IntegerLiteral
IntegerLiteral := stringOfDigits ’ˆˆ’ ’xsd:integer’
stringOfDigits := a sequence of digits enclosed in a pair of ”
(U+22)
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3.2 Compliance Checking
Internally, SPECIAL’s components encode also policies and
the entries of the transparency ledger with a fragment (pro-
file) of OWL2 called PL (policy logic) [6]. The adoption
of a logic-based description language has manifold reasons.
First, it has a clean, unambiguous semantics, that is a must
for policy languages. A formal approach brings the follow-
ing advantages:
– strong correctness and completeness guarantees on the
algorithms for permission checking and compliance
checking;
– the mutual coherence of the different reasoning tasks re-
lated to policies, such as policy validation, permission
checking, compliance checking, and explanations (cf.
tasks T1–T4 and the subsequent paragraph);
– correct usage after data is transferred to other controllers
(i.e. interoperability). When it comes to so-called sticky
policies [20], that constitute a sort of a license that ap-
plies to the data released to third parties, it is essential
that all parties understand the sticky policy in the same
way.
Policies are modeled as OWL2 classes. If the policy de-
scribes a controller’s activity, then its instances represent all
the operations that the controller may possibly execute. If
the policy describes consent, then its instances represent all
the operations permitted by the data subject. A description
of (part of) the controller’s activity – called business pol-
icy in SPECIAL (possibly represented as a transparency log
entry) – complies with a consent policy if the former is a
subclass of the latter, that is, all the possible operations de-
scribed by the business policies are also permitted by the
given consent.
Example 2 Consider again Example 1. The JSON-like rep-
resentation used there can be directly mapped onto an
OWL2 class ObjectUnionOf(P1 P2), where P2 is
4:
ObjectIntersectionOf(
ObjectSomeValueFrom(
has_purpose SocialNetworking )
ObjectSomeValueFrom(
has_data LocationData)
ObjectSomeValueFrom(
has_processing Transfer)
ObjectSomeValueFrom(
has_recipient DataSubjFriends)
ObjectSomeValueFrom(
has_storage ObjectIntersectionOf(
ObjectSomeValueFrom(has_location: EU)
DataSomeValueFrom(has_duration
DatatypeRestriction(xsd:integer
xsd:minInclusive "365"ˆˆxsd:integer
xsd:maxInclusive "1825"ˆˆxsd:integer
)))
4 We omit P1 due to space limitations; the reader may easily derive
it by analogy with the above example.
Fig. 2: SPECIAL’s Business Policy Language Grammar
BusinessPolicy := BasicBP |
’ObjectUnionOf’ ’(’ BasicBP { BasicBP }* ’)’
BasicBP :=’ObjectIntersectionOf’ ’(’ Data Purpose Process-
ing Recipients Storage {Duty}* {LegalBasis} ’)’
Data := see Section 3
Purpose := see Section 3
Processing := see Section 3
Recipients := see Section 3
Storage := see Section 3
Duty :=’ObjectSomeValuesFrom’ ’(’ ’sbpl:hasDuty’ DutyEx-
pression ’)’
DutyExpression :=’sbpl:AnyDuty’ | DutyVocabExpression
LegalBasis :=’ObjectSomeValuesFrom’ ’(’ ’sbpl:hasLegalBasis
LegalBasisVocabExpression ’)’
In order to check whether a business policy BP (en-
coded as an OWL2 class) complies with the above policy
one should check whether the former is a subclass of the
latter, that is, whether:
SubClassOf(BP ObjectUnionOf(P1 P2))
is a logical consequence of the ontology that defines SPE-
CIAL’s vocabularies.
4 Business Processes Compliance Checking
Beyond consent, the GDPR defines obligations that apply to
the data controllers / processors internal systems and pro-
cesses. Here are two examples:
– whenever the data controller operates on personal data,
it must acquire explicit consent from the involved data
subjects, unless the purpose of data processing falls
within a set of exceptional cases (e.g. the processing is
required by law); cf. Article 6.1, (b)–(f);
– whenever data are transferred to a third country whose
data protection regulations do not match the EU require-
ments, alternative guarantees must be provided, e.g. in
the form of company regulations called binding corpo-
rate rules, cf. Article 47 and, more generally, GDPR
Chapter V (Transfer Of Personal Data To Third Coun-
tries Or International Organisations).
Moreover, and differently from the above examples, the
GDPR sets obligations that are not directly related to the
controller’s business processes, such as the requirement that
data subjects have the right to access, rectify, and delete their
personal data. In order to fulfill such obligations, data con-
trollers have to set up suitable processes. Last but not least,
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it is useful to label the controller/processors processes with
the legal basis for the processing; this helps in assessing and
demonstrating the lawfulness of data processing activities.
For automated compliance checking descriptions of internal
systems and processes should be adequately formalized in
a machine-understandable way; moreover, the formalization
should represent accurately the real processes, in order to
make the automated compliance verification reliable.
4.1 Encoding Business Processes as Policies
In SPECIAL, we address a concrete setting in which a par-
tial and abstract description of processes is available. Each
process description is shaped like a formalized business pol-
icy consisting of the following set of features:
– the file(s) to be processed;
– the software that carries out the processing;
– the purpose of the processing;
– the entities that can access the results of the processing;
– the details of where the results are stored and for how
long;
– the obligations that are fulfilled while (or before) carry-
ing out the processing;
– the legal basis of the processing.
It is not hard to see that the first five elements in the above
list match SPECIAL’s usage policy language (UPL) intro-
duced in Section 3. As far as the above elements are con-
cerned, the only difference between UPL expressions and
a business policy is the granularity of attribute values. For
example, the involved data (specified in the first element
of the above list) are not expressed as a general, content-
oriented category, but rather as a concrete set of data sources
or data items. Such objects can be modeled as instances or
subclasses of the general data categories illustrated in Sec-
tion 3, thereby creating a link between digital artifacts and
usage policies. Similar considerations hold for the other at-
tributes:
– processing is not necessarily described in the abstract
terms adopted by the processing vocabulary introduced
in Section 3; in a business policy, this can be specified
by naming concrete software procedures;
– the purpose of data processing may be directly related to
the data controller’s mission and products;
– recipients may consist of a concrete list of legal and/or
physical persons, as opposed to general categories such
as Ours or ThirdParty;
– storage may be specified by a list of specific data repos-
itories, at the level of files and hosts.
With this level of granularity, specific authorizations can be
derived from the business policy, for example:
The indicated software procedure can read the indi-
cated data sources. The results can be written in the
specified repositories. The specified recipients can
read the repositories...
This methodology for generating authorizations fosters a
close correspondence between the business policy and the
actual behavior of the data controller’s systems and pro-
cesses.
The attribute encoding obligations is not part of usage
policies. It plays a dual role, representing:
– preconditions authorizations specified by the busi-
ness policy, e.g. if the obligation is something like
getValidConsent then the derived authorizations
is a rule like the specified software can read the data
sources if consent has been given;
– obligation assertions (under human responsibility) that
the data controller has set up processes for fulfilling the
indicated obligations – e.g. a process to obtain consent
from the data subjects – which is relevant to checking
compliance with the GDPR.
4.2 Business Policies in OWL2
A basic business policy is simply a usage policy (as
in Section 3) extended with zero or more obligations,
and a legal basis, encoded with attributes hasDuty and
hasLegalBasis, for example the following policy asso-
ciates the collection of personal demographic information to
the obligations to get consent and let the data subject exer-
cise her rights:
ObjectIntersectionOf(
ObjectSomeValuesFrom
(spl:hasData svd:Demographic)
ObjectSomeValuesFrom
(spl:hasProcessing svpr:Collect)
ObjectSomeValuesFrom
(spl:hasPurpose svpu:Account)
ObjectSomeValuesFrom
(spl:hasRecipient svr:Ours)
ObjectSomeValuesFrom
(spl:hasStorage
ObjectIntersectionOf(
spl:hasLocation svl:OurServers
spl:hasDuration svdu:Indefinitely
)
)
ObjectSomeValuesFrom
(sbpl:hasDuty getValidConsent)
ObjectSomeValuesFrom
(sbpl:hasDuty getAccessReqs)
ObjectSomeValuesFrom
(sbpl:hasDuty getRectifyReqs)
ObjectSomeValuesFrom
(sbpl:hasDuty getDeleteReqs)
ObjectSomeValuesFrom
(sbpl:hasLegalBasis A6-1-a-explicit-consent)
)
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Similarly to usage policies, general business policies
can be composed by enclosing several basic business poli-
cies inside the ObjectUnionOf operator of OWL2. The
syntax and the logical semantics of SPECIAL’s Business
Policy Language are specified in Figure 2. The values for
attributes DutyVocabExpression and LegalBasisVocabExpres-
sion are specified in DPVCG’s vocabularies.
4.3 Partial Encoding of the GDPR in OWL2
The GDPR cannot be fully axomatized due to the usual
difficulties that arise in axiomatizing legal text (especially
the frequent use of subjective terms as highlighted in Sec-
tion 2). However it is possible to encode some constraints
that should hold over the different attributes of a business
policy. At the top level, the formalization is organized as
follows:
ObjectUnionOf(
ObjectIntersectionOf(
Chap2 LawfulProcessing
Chap3 RightsOfDataSubjects
Chap4 ControllerAndProcessorObligations
Chap5 DataTransfer
)
Chap9 Derogations
)
Informally, the above expression says that either the require-
ments of GDPR Chapters 1–5 are satisfied, or some of the
derogations provided by GDPR Chapter 9 should apply. In
turn, each of the above terms is equivalent to a compound
OWL2 class that captures more details from the regula-
tion. Here we illustrate part of the formalization of GDPR
Chapter 2 for an example. Chap2 LawfulProcessing
is equivalent to the following expression:
ObjectUnionOf(
Art6 LawfulProcessing
Art9 SensitiveData
Art10 CriminalData
)
The above three conditions apply, respectively, to non-
sensitive personal data, sensitive data, and criminal data. At
least one of the three conditions should be satisfied. In turn,
Art6 LawfulProcessing is defined as:
ObjectUnionOf(
ObjectSomeValuesFrom(spl:hasData
SensitiveData as per Art9
)
ObjectSomeValuesFrom(spl:hasData
CriminalConvictionData as per Art10
)
Art6 1 LegalBasis
Art6 4 CompatiblePurpose
)
)
Roughly speaking, the above union represents an implica-
tion in disjunctive normal form, and should be read like this:
if the data involved in the processing is neither sensitive nor
criminal conviction data, then either the fundamental legal
bases of Art. 6(1) apply, or the processing is compatible with
the original purpose for collecting the data as per Art. 6(4).
In order to capture this meaning, class Art6 1 is defined
as:
ObjectSomeValuesFrom(hasLegalBasis
ObjectUnionOf(
Art6 1 a Consent
Art6 1 b Contract
Art6 1 c LegalObligation
Art6 1 d VitalInterest
Art6 1 e PublicInterest
Art6 1 f LegitimateInterest
)
)
Roughly speaking, this definition means that a business pol-
icy satisfies the requirements of Art. 6(1) if it contains a
clause
ObjectSomeValueFrom( hasLegalBasis X )
where X is some of the above classes corresponding to
points a–f of Art. 6(1). In practice, this means that a
human expert has to pick an appropriate legal basis for
each business policy. Similarly, the formalization of Ar-
ticle 9 applies to sensitive data categories only, and re-
quires a legal basis from a different list. So the term
SensitiveData as per Art9 is equivalent to:
ObjectUnionOf(
ObjectSomeValuesFrom(spl:hasData
ObjectComplementOf(SensitiveData as per Art9)
)
ObjectSomeValuesFrom(hasLegalBasis
ObjectUnionOf(
Art9 2 a Consent
Art9 2 b EmploymentAndSocialSecurity
Art9 2 c VitalInterest
Art9 2 d LegitimateActivitiesOfAssociations
Art9 2 e PublicData
Art9 2 f Juducial
Art9 2 g PublicInteres
Art9 2 h PreventiveOrOccupationalMedicine
Art9 2 i PublicHealth
Art9 2 j ArchivingResearchStatistics
)
)
)
The rest of the regulation is formalized with a similar ap-
proach.
4.4 Compliance Checking
Let us now make an example of compliance checking of a
business policy w.r.t. the above axiomatization. Consider the
following business policy:
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ObjectIntersectionOf(
ObjectSomeValuesFrom( hasData Religion )
ObjectSomeValuesFrom( hasProcessing Collect )
ObjectSomeValuesFrom( hasPurpose
PersonalisedBenefits )
ObjectSomeValuesFrom( hasStorage
ObjectSomeValuesFrom( hasLocation EU ))
ObjectSomeValuesFrom( hasRecipient
DataProcessor )
ObjectSomeValuesFrom( hasDuty
Art12-22 SubjectRights )
ObjectSomeValuesFrom( hasDuty
Art32-37 Obligations )
ObjectSomeValuesFrom( hasLegalBasis
Art6 1 a Consent )
)
This policy is not a subclass of the formalized GDPR
(hence it does not pass the compliance check) because
Religion is classified as sensitive data (it is a subclass of
SensitiveData as per Art9). Then the business pol-
icy is not a subclass of Art9 SensitiveData, because
the legal basis is not among the required list. Moreover, the
business policy is not covered by the derogations provided
by GDPR Chapter 9 (details are omitted here). As a conse-
quence, the business policy does not satisfy the conditions
specified by Chap2 LawfulProcessing. Note that this
kind of compliance checking is able to verify the coherency
of the different parts of a business policy.
If Religion was replaced by any non-sensitive
data category such as Location, then the policy
would be compliant because it would be a subclass
of Art6 LawfulProcessing. This satisfies the
condition called Chap2 LawfulProcessing. The
hasDuty attributes of the business policy suffice
to satisfy Chap3 RightsOfDataSubjects and
Chap4 ControllerAndProcessorObligations.
Chap5 DataTransfer would also be satisfied since the
processing does not involve any transfers outside the EU.
5 Our Automated Compliance Checking Algorithm
Business policies (that describe the processing of each of
the controller’s processes) are not only needed to fulfill the
requirements of Article 30. They can also be used to check
whether a running process complies with the available con-
sent, as a sort of access control system. Several implemen-
tation strategies are possible, depending on the controller’s
system architecture; to fix ideas, the reader may consider
the following generic approach: Each of the controller’s pro-
cesses is labeled with a corresponding business policy that
describes it, and before processing a piece of data, the busi-
ness policy is compared with the data subject’s consent to
check whether the operation is permitted.
In general, such compliance checks occur frequently
enough to call for a scalable implementation. Consider, for
example, a telecom provider that collects location informa-
tion to offer location-based services. Locations cannot be
stored without a legal basis, such as law requirements or
consent – not even temporarily, while a batch process se-
lects the parts that can be legally kept. So compliance check-
ing needs to be executed on the fly. In order to estimate
the amount of compliance checks involved, consider that the
events produced by the provider’s base stations are approx-
imately 15000 per second; the probing records of wi-fi net-
works are about 850 millions per day.
In order to meet such performance requirements, SPE-
CIAL has developed ad-hoc reasoning algorithms for PL
[6], that leverage PL’s simplicity to achieve unprecedented
reasoning speed. Compliance checking is split into two
phases: first, business policies are normalized and closed un-
der the axioms contained in the vocabularies; in the second
phase, business policies are compared with consent policies
with a structural subsumption algorithm. We have just com-
pleted the evaluation of a sequential Java implementation of
those algorithms, called PLR. We chose Java to facilitate the
comparison with other engines, by exploiting the standard
OWL APIs, and we refrained to apply parallelization tech-
niques in order to assess the properties of the basic algo-
rithms. Before discussing more performant implementation
options, we report the results for PLR.
PLR can pre-compute the first phase, since the business
policies are known in advance and are typically persistent.
So the runtime cost is reduced to structural subsumption. In
this way, on the test cases derived fromSPECIAL’s use cases
(cf. Table 1), the performance we achieve, respectively, is
150µsec and 190µsec per compliance check, using the fol-
lowing system:
processor: Intel Xeon Silver 4110
cores: 8
cache: 11M
RAM: 198 GB
OS: Ubuntu 18.4
JVM: 1.8.0 181
heap: 32 GB (actually used: less than 700 MB).
This means that PLR alone can execute about 6000 compli-
ance checks per second and more than 518 million checks
per day, that is, 60% of wi-fi probing events and 40% of
base station events.
In order to raise performance up to the required levels,
one can re-engineer PLR using a language more performant
than Java, and/or parallelize processing by means of big
data architectures. Compliance checking is particularly well
suited to parallelization, since each test is independent from
the others and no synchronization is required. Additionally,
the investigation of parallelization within PLR’s algorithms
is under investigation.
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Pilot 1 Pilot 2
Ontology
inclusions 186 186
disjoint class axioms 11 11
property range axioms 10 10
functional properties 8 8
classification hierarchy height 4 4
Business policies
# generated policies 120 100
avg. simple pol. per full pol. 2.71 2.39
Consent policies
# generated policies 12,000 10,000
avg. simple pol. per full pol. 3.77 3.42
Test cases
# compliance checks 12,000 10,000
Table 1: Test cases derived from SPECIAL’s pilots
6 Related Work
From a GDPR compliance perspective, there exist several
compliance tools (cf. [1, 10, 15, 16]) that enable companies
to assess the compliance of applications and business pro-
cesses via predefined questionnaires.
There is also a large body of work on legal knowledge
representation (cf.[4, 18]) and reasoning (cf. [2, 9, 14, 17]).
From a representation perspective, Bartolini et al. [4] and
Pandit et al. [18] propose ontologies that can be used to
model data protection requirements. While, Palmirani et al.
[17] and Athan et al. [2] demonstrate how LegalRuleML
can be used to specify legal norms. The work by Lam and
Hashmi [14] and Governatori et al. [9] also builds upon
LegalRuleML, however the focus is more on ensuring busi-
ness process compliance.
Both rule languages and OWL2 have already been used
as policy languages; a non-exhaustive list is [7, 11, 12, 22,
23]. As noted in [5], the advantage of OWL2 – hence de-
scription logics – is that all the main policy-reasoning tasks
are decidable (and tractable if policies can be expressed with
OWL2 profiles), while compliance checking is undecidable
in rule languages, or at least intractable – in the absence of
recursion – because it can be reduced to datalog query con-
tainment. So an OWL2-based policy language is a natural
choice in a project like SPECIAL, where policy compari-
son is the predominant task. Among the aforementioned lan-
guages, both Rei and Protune [7, 12] support logic program
rules, which make them unsuitable to SPECIAL’s purposes.
KAoS [22] is based on a description logic that, in general, is
not tractable, and supports role-valuemaps – a construct that
easily makes reasoning undecidable (see [3], Chap. 5). The
papers on KAoS do not discuss how to address this issue.
P3P’s privacy policies – that are encoded in XML
– and simple PL policies have a similar structure:
the tag STATEMENT contains tags PURPOSE, RECIPIENT,
RETENTION, and DATA-GROUP, that correspond to the anal-
ogous properties of SPECIAL’s usage policies. Only the
information on the location of data is missing. The tag
STATEMENT is included in a larger context that adds informa-
tion about the controller (tag ENTITY) and about the space
of web resources covered by the policy (through so-called
policy reference files). Such additional pieces of information
can be directly encoded with simple PL concepts.
There exist several well-engineered reasoners for OWL2
and its profiles. Hermit [8] is a general reasoner for OWL2.
Over the test cases inspired by SPECIAL’s use cases, it takes
3.67ms and 3.96ms per compliance check, respectively, that
is, over 20 times longer than PLR. ELK [13] is a special-
ized polynomial-time reasoner for the OWL2-EL profile. It
does not support functional roles, nor the interval constraints
used to model storage duration, therefore it cannot be used
to reason on the PL profile. Konclude [21] is a highly op-
timized reasoner with “pay-as-you-go” strategies (i.e. it be-
comes more efficient on less complex profiles of OWL2).
Konclude is designed for classification, and is currently not
optimized for subsumption tests (i.e. the reasoning task un-
derlying compliance checks). Consequently, it turns out to
be slower than Hermit on our test cases.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
The overarching goal of the SPECIAL project is to develop
tools and technologies that enable data controllers and pro-
cessors to comply with personal data processing obligations
specified in the GDPR. In this paper, we presented the SPE-
CIAL policy language and discussed how it can be used
to encode consent, business policies, and regulatory obliga-
tions. In addition we described the SPECIAL approaches to
GDPR compliance checking and presented the results of our
initial performance evaluation.
Ongoing/future work includes: the optimisation of the
existing compliance checking algorithm to cater for auto-
mated compliance checking for a broader set of legislative
requirements; and the development of an algebra that can be
used to combine multiple policies, for instance where there
is a need to aggregate data from multiple data sources.
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